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ARTICLES




In the opening scene of the movie The Player,' Griffin Mill, a studio
executive, meets with several different "idea men' 2 to hear their pitches for
potential movies. Any one of these pitches may eventually turn out to be
the next blockbuster hit, the next bomb, the next idea to be condemned to
development damnation, or it may simply never be spoken of again. While
the studio executive acts as if listening to pitch after pitch is a harrowing
experience, everyone knows that he is licking his chops, waiting for the
idea that will propel him up the studio ranks. After all, "'[w]ho can resist
something that sounds like a good movie?... Ideas are so seductive. A
good pitch is irresistible."' 3
Not all television or movie ideas originate from pitch meetings, many
ideas are presented in the form of fully-developed scripts or lesser-
developed treatments. Yet, regardless of how the idea-man chooses to
present his idea, scripts and pitches raise serious concerns over the rights
of studios and the rights of idea-men to the idea presented.
For instance, in one pitch meeting, Griffin Mill asks "What have you
got for me?"; in another he asks, "What's your pitch?"; and in that same
* Associate, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. B.S.,
Louisiana State University.
1. THE PLAYER (Fine Line 1992). The film The Player was directed by Robert Altman,
written by Michael Tolkin, and stars Tim Robbins as Griffin Mill.
2. Professor Nimmer defines the "idea man" as "one who creates only an idea, not literary
property, or who having created literary property finds that only his idea and not his 'expression'
has been borrowed." DAvID NMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 16.01 (1993).
3. Andy Marx, Producers: Specs In, Pitches Out, DAILY VARiETY, Oct. 25, 1993, at 3
(quoting producer Robert Kosberg).
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meeting, he concludes "[i]t's an intriguing idea .... Let it sit with me for
a couple of days .... Let me get back with you. ' '4 Suppose Griffin Mill
4. Below is a transcript of two pitches from The Player, (Fine Line 1992). The idea man
is noted by "IM" while the executive, Griffin Mill, is "GM."
First Idea Man (IM) -
GM: What have you got for me?
IM: Ok. Here it is. The Graduate Part II.
GM: Oh, good.
IM: Now listen. The three principals are still with us. Dustin Hoffman, Anne
Bancroft, Katherine Ross. Twenty-five years later. And so are the
characters, Ben, Elaine, and Mrs. Robinson. Ben and Elaine are married
still. They live in a big spooky old house, oh, in Northern California
somewhere. And Mrs. Robinson lives with them. Her aging mother who's
had a stroke.
GM: Mrs. Robinson had a stroke?
IM: Yeah, Mrs. Robinson had a stroke, so she can't talk.
GM: Is this going to be funny?
IM: Yeah, it'll be funny. Dark and weird and funny and with a stroke.
GM: OK.
IM: Maybe it's not a stroke, maybe, I don't know what it is...
GM: Anyway, go on.
IM: It's a malady of some sort. She's up there in the bedroom upstairs listening
to everything that happens. They've got a daughter who has just graduated
from college.
GM: That's good. That's good. Young blood.
IM: Twenty-two, twenty-three years old, like a Julia Roberts.
GM: Great, that's great.
IM: Ok, Julia Roberts, their daughter, the graduate...
GM: The new graduate. The post graduate...
Next Idea Man, "Jim" -
GM: What's your pitch?
Jim: Well, does political scare you?
GM: Political doesn't scare me. Radical-political scares me.
Jim: This is slightly politically radical, but -
GM: Is it funny?
Jim: It's funny.
GM: It's a funny political thing.
Jim: It's a funny, it's a thriller too.
GM: It's a thriller.
Jim: And it's all at once... Well, I want Bruce Willis. I think I can talk to him.
It's a story about a Senator, a bad guy Senator at fnst, and he's traveling
around the country on the country's dime, you know, like that Sununu guy
used too.
GM: I see, sort of a cynical political thriller comedy.
Jim: Yeah, but it's got a heart, uh, in the right spot. And, anyway, he has an
accident.
GM: An accident.
Jim: Yeah, and he becomes clairvoyant.
GM: Oh, I see.
Jim: Like a psychic.
GM: So it's kind of a psychic political thriller comedy with a heart.
Jim: And, uh, not unlike "Ghost" meets "Manchurian Candidate."
GM: Go on, go on, I'm listening.
Jim: Anyway, he can start to read people's minds, and he gets to the President's
mind, and it's completely blank. Completely blank . ... Of course,
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never calls, but instead hires a writer to draft a screenplay based upon the
idea-man's pitch.5 Will the idea-man be protected? Does it matter that the
parties met at an appointed time at Griffin Mill's office on the studio lot?
If not, does it matter that Griffin Mill expressly requested the pitch at the
beginning of the meeting? Taking the hypothetical a step further, would
it matter if Griffin Mill was a bartender instead of a studio executive?
What if the bartender or the studio executive never asked to hear the idea?
On a different note, what if the idea-man had faxed a full script to Griffin
Mill? Or a "spec" script? What if copyright does not provide adequate
protection? Each of these questions raise very real problems for not only
the studio executive and the idea-man, but also every company or person
that receives or creates a potentially valuable idea.6
Ordinarily, products of the mind or intellectual endeavors are
protected under one of five traditional areas of intellectual property law:
someone gets killed at the end. They always do in political thrillers.
GM: It's an intriguing idea Jim. Let it sit with me for a couple of days.
Jiri: Ok. We've got to get someone really dangerous.
GM: I'm with you there.
Jim: Like Bruce Willis or Mel Gibson.
GM: Let me get back with you.
5. See Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (idea-man sues
producer for hiring another writer to pen a script based on ideas from plaintiff's script); Fink v.
Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Cal. 1970) (idea-man presents plan for a
television series to producer who turns it down and appears to use the ideas in a later series). See
generally Midas Prod., Inc. v. Baer, 437 F. Supp. 1388, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (plaintiff sues
under copyright for defendant's use of a script that had seven plot similarities and three scenes
common to plaintiff's script).
6. The definition of "idea" is as amorphous as one may expect. As one commentator stated,
"an 'idea' is not an epistemological concept, but a legal conclusion prompted by notions - often
unarticulated and unproven - of appropriate competition. Thus, copyright doctrine attaches the
label 'idea' to aspects of work which, if protected, would (or, we fear, might) preclude, or render
too expensive, subsequent authors' endeavors." Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and
Other Protection of Works of Infonnation After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUm. L. REv.
338, 346 (1992). In the courts, the definition of "idea" changes depending upon which court is
deciding the case, and which form of idea protection is being discussed. That is, requirements
such as concreteness and novelty shape which conceptions fit within the term "idea."
Rather than emphasizing novelty and concreteness, the author finds that an idea should be
defined as any disclosure which is considered valuable to the parties. See infra part V. Because
this Article does not support a property theory in ideas, there is no need to distinguish between
protected and unprotected ideas except when determining value under the quasi-contract, implied-
in-fact contract, or express contract theories. While copyright law has struggled to distinguish
idea from expression, protecting only the latter, idea law, by placing the emphasis on value, may
avoid this struggle to separate the formulated idea from the unformulated idea.
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patent,7 trademark,8 copyright,9 trade secret,'0 and unfair competition."
Given the vast reach of intellectual property protection, it would seem that
the idea-man could find solace under one of these five areas. However,
this has not been the case. Instead, the idea-man, while not always left
totally unprotected, has been wading through a morass of court opinions
providing unpredictable, and, at best, inconsistent protection.
This Article will provide some helpful guidance to the idea-man and
his prospective purchaser by putting some order to the myriad of cases
known as "idea law." Part II gives an overview of the five theories of idea
protection that have been adopted by the states in varying degrees. The
overview includes a discussion of the general requirements for idea
protection under each of the theories and the problems confronted by each,
7. The patent laws extend protection only to inventions that are new, useful, and nonobvious
processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, or new and useful improvements
thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1995).
8. Trademark and servicemark law are primarily mechanisms for identifying and
distinguishing goods and services from other goods and services in the marketplace. Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1995).
9. Copyright protection subsists in "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("The Copyright Act of 1976"). However, copyright
is never recognized in ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts,
principles or discoveries. Id. § 102(b).
10. Trade secret law protects "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). See, e.g.,
Uniform Trade Secret Act, CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426 (West 1992).
11. Unfair competition law includes a number of different theories for legally unacceptable
behavior in the marketplace, including: passing off, false advertising, disparagement, dilution,
and misappropriation.
First, passing off is a false representation that will lead consumers to believe that the goods
or services being "passed off' are those of another. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a). See also Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); Smith v. Chanel,
Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
Second, false advertising is the act of intentionally misrepresenting the nature of one's
goods. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §1125(a).
Third, disparagement is the act of making a false or deceptive statement of fact about the
quality of another's goods or services. lId
Fourth, dilution is the act of using a mark or trade name similar to another's very strong
mark or trade name on dissimilar goods or services which dilutes the strong association the public
has with the mark or name. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
Fifth, misappropriation is unfair competition. To recover on the grounds of misappro-
priation, a person must show: (1) that he invested a substantial amount of time, money, skill or
effort in creating something that the court recognizes as property; (2) that the "misappropriator"
has appropriated the creation in such a way that he has reaped where he has not sown; and (3)
that the creator has been injured as a result. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918).
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specifically regarding the requirements of novelty and concreteness, and the
effect of federal preemption. Part I presents the basic laws of California
and New York, the two jurisdictions that most often deal with idea
protection and the entertainment industry. Part IV discusses available
methods for both the seller and purchaser to avoid litigation under current
doctrines. Finally, Part V concludes with a recommendation for a uniform
method of handling idea protection cases. 2
I. FIVE THEORmS OF IDEA PROTECTION
It is a long-standing and general rule that ideas are as "free as the
air."' 3 Justice Brandeis made this point clear in his oft-quoted dissent to
the seminal property case International News Service v. Associated
Press.4 Specifically, Brandeis stated that ideas "become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common use."' 5 However, as
with all general rules, there are notable exceptions. In Desny v. Wilder, the
California Supreme Court noted such possibilities by stating, "there can be
circumstances when neither air nor ideas may be acquired without cost."'
6
It is with these exceptions that this Article is concerned.
Basically, current idea law can be ordered into five theories of
protection: property, quasi-contract or unjust enrichment, express contract,
implied-in-fact contract, and confidential relationship.
A. Property Theory
Property, in the legal sense, is defined as the "aggregate of rights
which are guaranteed and protected by the government."' 17 Included in the
bundle of property rights is the right to exclude others from using and
enjoying one's property."8 Thus, the property theory, taken literally,
12. For other solutions to the idea protection problem, see Kerry Ryan, Using the Uniform
Commercial Code to Protect the "Ideas" that Make the Movies, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693
(1987); Margreth Barrett, The "Law of Ideas" Reconsidered, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 691 (1987) (recommending protection similar to trade secret law for ideas).
13. Professor Nimmer traces this concept back to the first century A.D. NIMMER, supra note
2, § 16.01 n.4 (citing Epistles 12:11).
14. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
15. Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
16. 299 P.2d 257, 265 (Cal. 1956).
17. AMERICAN HERrrAGE DICnTONARY, at 850 (2d College ed. 1985).
18. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.02; International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); Desny, 299 P.2d at 265 (Cal. 1956).
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would provide the creator of an idea the exclusive right to prevent the use
or disclosure of such idea without the idea-man's permission.
The granting of property rights in ideas raises the policy concern that
these rights impede progress as those embarking on intellectual endeavors
are faced with one roadblock after another.19 In other words, creativity
and improvements are stifled as the artist or inventor chooses not to
publicize his creation or invention out of fear of liability to the idea-man.
On the other hand, protecting ideas creates an incentive for the idea-man
to disclose his idea, ultimately promoting progress as artists, inventors, and
the general public have access to ideas which otherwise may have been
withheld. The overriding question is, where should the commons end and
the property begin? In other words, at what point is the incentive of
property protection no longer necessary to aid progress?
The tension between creating an incentive to invent and protecting the
free flow of ideas is not new. The Court addressed the same problem in
the 1879 case Baker v. Selden20 where copyright protection was extended
only to the method of expressing the idea, not to the idea itself.2"
Similarly, patent law provides an inventor of a novel, nonobvious, and
useful invention with a monopoly in the invention for a limited time; but
the inventor does not have a monopoly in the underlying idea.22 For
instance, Alexander Graham Bell, in patenting the telephone, received the
exclusive right to his invention, but he did not have any exclusive rights in
the idea of communicating through wire. Given the conclusions reached
in these intellectual property fields, it is not difficult to understand why
courts and commentators have been extremely cautious in embracing the
property theory for protecting ideas. Notwithstanding the status of
copyright and patent law, there have been a few courts that have found that
the best way to relieve the tension is to recognize property rights in ideas.
19. See Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73, 84-85 (Cal. 1950)
(Traynor, C.J., dissenting) ("They would indeed be stifled in their efforts to create forms worth
protecting, if in the common through which they ranged they were diverted from their course by
one enclosure after another."); Barrett, supra note 12, at 696 ("Recognizing property rights in
ideas may serve as an incentive to creativity, but it also may serve as a roadblock to creativity
on the part of others."); Grant Hammond, The Legal Protection of Ideas, 29 OSGOODE HALL Li.
93, 97 (1991) ("[I]deas are part of the seamless web of humanity. Breaking pieces out of that
web, unless for an overwhelming justification, robs us of part of ourselves.").
20. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
21. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (disallowing copyright in idea because plaintiff
would have a de facto monopoly in the.idea without satisfying the stringent patent standards).
22. See The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-351.
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1. Scope of Protection
There are primarily two areas in which such courts have recognized
a property interest in ideas - slogans,' and radio and television for-
mats.24 However, before these courts will recognize a property interest in
23. NIsmR, supra note 2, § 16.02. See also Marcus Advertising, Inc. v. M.M. Fisher
Assocs., Inc., 444 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1971) (although court recognizes property right, defendant
prevails due to lack of novelty in slogan); O'Hara v. Gardner Advertising, Inc., 300 N.Y.S.2d 441
(N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (although unfair competition claim recognized, defendant prevails due to
no secondary meaning in the "Have a Happy" slogan); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 27
Cal. Rptr. 833 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (plaintiff granted preliminary injunction for the slogan
"Wonderful World of the Grimm Brothers" in an unfair competition claim); Healey v. Macy &
Co., 14 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1938) (plaintiff recovers for misappropriation of literary property in the
slogan "A Macy, Macy Christmas and a Happy New Year"). Cf. Barrett, supra note 12, at 698-
709 (arguing that the courts that seem to recognize a property right in ideas have simply failed
to specify which of the other four theories they were adopting).
24. A format for a television or radio series has been defined as: "a written presentation
which sets forth the framework of the serial or episodic series within which the central running
characters will operate and which framework is intended to be repeated in each episode, the
setting, theme, premise or general story line of the proposed serial or episodic series." Barrett,
supra note 12, at 705 n.68 (citing Writers Guild of America, 1960 Television Film Basic
Agreement as modified by memorandum of June 15, 1966, re: 1966 WGA TV Film
Negotiations, art. l(i)(aa)).
For cases endorsing the property theory in radio and television formats, see NIMMER, supra
note 2, § 16.02; Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd, 210
F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ("The law now gives effect to a property right in an idea even though
the idea may be neither patentable nor subject to copyright.'); Kovacs v. Mutual Broadcasting
Sys., 221 P.2d 108, 112 (Cal. 1950) (In finding that a written and recorded radio program format
was a protectable product of the mind, the court reasoned that "[an author who takes existing
materials from sources common to all writers" is entitled to protection if the format is both
original and novel); Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 256 P.2d 962, 969 (Cal. 1953) (In
finding causes of action to exist for infringement of a written and recorded radio program format,
the court reasoned that "for Kurlan to have a protectable interest in his radio program idea as
reduced to a production format, he must establish both originality and novelty."). It should be
noted that both Kurlan and Kovacs arose prior to the amendment of California Civil Code § 980,
in which the amendment limited protection to "the author or proprietor of any composition" from
the previously broader provision providing protection for "the author of any product of the mind."
The amendment was interpreted to mean that California law recognizes the traditional theory of
protection under common law copyright, thereby possibly limiting the reaches of Kurlan and
Kovacs. See Weitzenkom v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 956 (Cal. 1953) (In sustaining a demurrer to
a claim for misappropriation of plaintiff's uncopyrighted literary composition, the court reasoned
that "[t]he idea alone, the bare, undeveloped story situation or theme, is not protectable.").
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an idea, the idea must be both novel' and concrete.26
a. Novelty
Taken literally, novelty requires that the idea be "strikingly new,
unusual, or different."27 Under such a definition, the novelty requirement
is tremendously more difficult to meet than the copyright burden of
originality. While originality requires that the author engage in some
intellectual endeavor and not just copy from a preexisting source,
novelty requires that no other such work has ever existed.29
However, like most issues in idea law, the novelty requirement has
been a source of confusion for the courts. Depending upon the jurisdiction,
some courts have required novelty in the literal sense, others have required
both novelty and originality, and still others have required novelty but used
the definition of originality.30 In actuality, courts that require both novelty
and originality are using the same standard as those that require only
novelty. After all, originality encompasses novelty. That is, if an idea is
novel (has never before existed), then obviously the idea is also original
(has not been copied from a preexisting source).31 Thus, depending on
the jurisdiction, novelty requires either that the idea has never existed
25. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
955 (1988) (In refusing to protect a non-novel written proposal for a television series from
misappropriation, the court stated that "ideas that reflect 'genuine novelty and invention' are fully
protected against unauthorized use."); Davies v. Carnation Co. 352 F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1965)
("A mere idea without novelty is not a property right to which one may claim exclusive
ownership."); Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706,708 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Woman Golfer,
Inc. v. Meredith Corp., 792 F. Supp. 211, 213-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (In refusing to protect a non-
novel oral proposal and written plan for a women's golf magazine from misappropriation, the
court stated that "[a] property right in an idea derives from its novelty and originality.").
26. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Sellers v. American
Broadcasting Co., 668 F.2d 1207, 1210 (11th Cir. 1982); O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
68 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Professor Nimmer argues that concreteness should be a
requirement for recovery under the property or quasi-contract theories because concreteness is
defined as an "idea... sufficiently developed so as to constitute 'property."' NIMMER, supra
note 2, § 16.08[A].
27. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 850 (2d College ed. 1985).
28. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
29. A similar requirement may be found in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1995).
30. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.08[B] at 16-59; see also Barrett, supra note 12, at 711
(describing the different interpretation of the novelty requirement as either original to the plaintiff,
innovative in character, or both original to the plaintiff and innovative in character).
31. Under the definitions provided in the preceding text, there can never be a novel idea that
is not original to the author. However, there are innumerable ideas which are original to the
author but not novel to the world. Thus, viewed as a Venn diagram, novelty is a smaller circle
falling completely within the larger circle of originality.
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before32 or that is be original to the idea-man (has not been copied from
a preexisting source).3
Courts that choose the more stringent novelty standard are reflecting
the policy that ideas which have previously been in the public domain
should remain there, free for public use. On the other hand, courts that
require only originality have adopted the policy that ideas, like other
intellectual creations, should be protected as property of the creator, so long
as the creator's independent efforts lead to the submission of the idea.
b. Concreteness
As ironic as it may seem, the concreteness requirement is actually
fairly amorphous. Some courts require that in order to meet this require-
ment, an idea must be fixed in tangible form.' Others provide that an
idea is concrete when "it is ready for immediate use without any additional
embellishment."3 Still others hold that an idea is concrete when plaintiff
and defendant can reduce it to usable form within twenty-four hours.36
Professor Nimmer lambastes such heavy requirements. He argues that
requiring an idea to be developed to the point of present use is a contra-
diction in terms; that is, an idea ready for present use is no longer merely
an idea.37 Instead, he concludes that the concreteness requirement is
"another way of requiring that the idea be sufficiently developed so as to
32. See Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App. 1970).
33. See Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663, 665 (Nev. 1975). Professor Nimmer suggests
that under the property and quasi-contract theories, the idea-man is or should be held to the same
burden of proof as in a copyright action, which would include no greater burden than originality.
NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.08[B] at 16-58.
34. O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, 68 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (extending
protection only to ideas in tangible form, and even then, only to the form of expression, not the
idea itself). See Barrett, supra note 12, at 712-13.
35. Recrion, 541 P.2d at 665. See also NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.08[A] (citing Falk,
Originality or Novelty in Cases of Misappropriation of Ideas, 33 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 888, 890
(1951); Bergman v. Electrolux Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Nev. 1983); Brief for Ass'n of
Motion Picture Producers, as amicus curiae, Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 221 P.2d 73
(Cal. 1950)); Barrett, supra note 12, at 714.
36. Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113, 120 (11. 1950) ("[Ie had in mind a specific device
which needed only his directions and the defendant's mechanical skill to reduce it to material
form within twenty-four hours"); NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.08[A].
37. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.08[A] at 16-53; See also Barrett, supra note 12, at 692 n.4
(stating that the law of undeveloped ideas generally only protects ideas that are concrete, and
many courts have defined "concrete" as "developed").
1995]
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constitute 'property.' ' '38  No matter what the definition, the requirement
of concreteness has led to inconsistent opinions.
39
Courts that require the idea to be fixed in a tangible form seem to
snuff out any possibility of protecting an idea as property. Specifically,
providing protection for ideas fixed in a tangible medium of expression
may be preempted by federal copyright law.' After all, copyright already
affords protection to expressions fixed in tangible media,41 and disallows
protection to ideas fixed in the same tangible media.42
On the other hand, those courts which require ideas to be developed,
rather than abstract, seem to be embracing the middle ground - under-
standing the tension between protecting individual intellectual labor and
foreclosing ideas from the public domain. However, "developed" often
entails nothing more than creating a copyrightable expression. These courts
do nothing but promote continued confusion and misguided expectations.
In all, the concreteness requirement is vague and unpredictable.
While the courts seem to embrace the concreteness standard in order to
distinguish between "protectable" and "unprotectable" ideas, the idea-man
38. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.08[A]; See Yadkoe v. Fields, 151 P.2d 906 (Cal. Dist. Ct
App. 1944) (citing Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206 (Ind. App. 1935)).
This definition of concreteness seems to beg the question. When determining whether an idea
is protectable property, the courts require novelty and concreteness. If concreteness is defined
as "sufficiently developed so as to constitute property," then the'inquiry has come full circle, after
all, the question is whether the idea is property.
39. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.08[A] at 16-54. Compare Yadkoe v. Fields, 151 P.2d 906
(1944) (holding various gags sufficiently concrete); Healey v. Macy, 277 N.Y. 681, 14 N.E.2d
388 (1938) (holding "A Macy, Macy Christmas and A Happy New Year" to be a protected
slogan); Liggett & Meyer v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206 (Ind. App. 1935) (holding concrete idea of "No
thanks, I smoke Chesterfields" to be misappropriated by the ad campaign "I'll stick to
Chesterfields") with Plus Promotions, Inc. v. RCA Mfg., 49 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
(holding a well worked out, but oral, idea for producing records without artists' names,
distributing them via newspaper, and aiming them at low-income purchasers to be not sufficiently
concrete); Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948)
(holding ad slogan "Neighborly Haberle" not sufficiently concrete); Williamson v. New York
Central Rail Co., 16 N.Y.S.2d 217 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939) (holding a letter describing the idea for
producing and staging a miniature railroad at the New York World's Fair not sufficiently
concrete).
40. See discussion on preemption, infra, part II.A.2.d.
41. Copyright protection subsists in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Unfixed works of authorship, such as pitches or any other transmission of
an idea without fixation in tangible form, are not subject to the Copyright Act, but may be
protectable by common law copyright or, as discussed throughout this paper, under "idea law."
42. Copyright protection does not extend to any idea or concept, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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and a prospective purchaser may be better protected by providing greater
predictability under a standard which questions the value of an idea, instead
of one which hinges upon the mode or method of disclosure.43
2. Problems
Although property theory cases purport to protect ideas as "property,"
there are several valid arguments that may lead one to conclude that the
current property protection for ideas is a farce.
a. Mistake
Confusion arises because courts frequently refer to "property rights"
in ideas, but seldom do these loose-lipped references mean anything more
than a property interest created by contract or a special relationship.M
One commentator has explored this argument and concluded that these
cases are the result of (1) some courts failing to adequately specify which
of the accepted means of idea protection they were adopting (express
contract, implied contract, quasi-contract, or confidential relationship),45
and (2) other courts misrelying on the former courts' vagueness.46
b. Impossible Burden
Courts that have adopted the property theory in its literal sense require
that the high hurdles of novelty and concreteness be cleared before
protection will be afforded. By requiring these elements, courts are in
43. See infra part V.
44. See Barrett, supra note 12, at 698; Vantage Point v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp.
1204, 1216 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[f]dea disclosure cases generally refer to the idea in suit as the
plaintiff's claimed 'property,' [but] the decisions have focused primarily on the relationship
between the parties (or lack thereof) and not on any a priori recognition of exclusivity in the
idea."); Downey v. General Foods Corp., 286 N.E.2d 257 (1972) ("An idea may be a property
right."); Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206, 210 (Ind. App. 1935).
45. Barrett, supra note 12. For cases which Barrett argues have been cited by courts as
endorsing the property theory, but in fact relied upon one of the other theories, see Sellers v.
American Broadcasting Co., 668 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1982); Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108
F. Supp. 689 (D.C.), af'd, 210 F.2d 706 (1953); Healey v. R.H. Macy & Co., 297 N.Y.S. 105
(N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd without opinion, 14 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1938); Stanley v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 75 (Cal. 1950); Howard J. Ryan & Assoc. v. Century Brewing
Ass'n, 55 P.2d 105 (Wash. 1936); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 194 N.E. 206 (Ind.
App. Ct. 1935).
46. Barrett, supra note 12. For cases which Barrett argues erroneously rely on precedent,
see Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689 (D.C. 1952), aft'd, 210 F.2d 706 (1953);
Silver v. Television City, Inc., 215 A.2d 335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965).
1995]
486 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
actuality, only paying lip service to the property theory of protecting
ideas.47 After all, the novelty and concreteness standards by definition
require more than a mere idea, i.e., the idea must be developed to a certain
degree. As a result, it is rare for an idea to be both novel and concrete,
thereby qualifying for property protection, and not otherwise qualifying for
protection under another wing of idea law. On the other hand, when an
idea is either not novel or not concrete, or both, it will not qualify for
property protection. Thus, while property protection may have a good ring
to it, as long as novelty and concreteness are the standards, property in
ideas is generally an unneeded and redundant form of protection.
c. Common Law Copyright - Not a Property Right in Ideas
Cases that have provided property protection to radio and television
formats under the guise of common law copyrighteg are problematic for
two reasons. First, protection under common law copyright does not
necessarily mean that courts have recognized the property theory for
protecting ideas. These courts may have intended only to expand the
subject matter considered to be copyrightable expression.49 If so, the
general idea is still in the public domain, but the developed idea embodied
in the radio or television format is protectable expression within the realm
of copyright. Second, common law copyright protection has been sharply
curtailed as of 1978 by the Copyright Act of 1976.'0
d. Preemption
Property protection for ideas may be preempted. Federal copyright
law preempts state created legal or equitable rights if the state rights (1) are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights as specified by Section 106 in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and
47. The problems and benefits of the novelty and concreteness requirement are discussed
supra part ll.A.l.a-b.
48. See Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Cal. 1970) (written proposal
for television series); Szczesny v. WGN Broadcasting Corp., 315 N.E.2d 263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)
(script for a retail store promotional television program).
49. Barrett, supra note 12, at 707 (arguing that formats are highly developed, complex
combinations of ideas that lie between undeveloped ideas and expressions).
50. For a discussion of preemption, see infra part II.A.2.d. It should be noted that even if
common law copyright protection for ideas expressed in tangible media has been preempted by
the 1976 Act, ideas expressed in intangible media, such as pantomime or spoken words, may still
be protectable by common law copyright.
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(2) come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103. 5'
i. Equivalent to Section 106 Exclusive Rights
Section 106 provides that the exclusive rights of a copyright owner
are the rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies,
perform publicly, and display publicly, the copyrighted work.52  The
prevailing test to determine if a state right is equivalent to any of the
federal rights is the "extra element" test. 3 In order for a state right to
avoid preemption, it must contain an extra element which changes the
nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright
infringement claim. 4  Thus, if the state law violation incorporates
elements beyond the scope of any exclusive federal rights, the state right
will not be considered equivalent and preemption will not occur.55 The
property theory seems to have no additional element to save it from
meeting the first of the two requirements for preemption.
it. Within the Subject Matter of Copyright
Even if the state-protected rights are equivalent to the federal rights,
preemption will not occur so long as the state rights do not come within the
subject matter of copyright. Section 102(a) defines the subject matter of
copyright to be original works of authorship, fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, including literary works. At first blush, it would seem that
protection of the tangible embodiment of an idea is preempted by federal
copyright law.57  However, section 102(b) provides that copyright
protection does not extend to any idea or concept, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied.
Thus, a debate has developed. Some argue that idea protection is not
preempted by federal copyright law because section 102(b) entirely
51. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
53. Barrett, supra note 12, at 724 (citing Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F.
Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
54. Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1535.
55. d (extra elements such as awareness or intent alter the scope but not the nature of an
action); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
56. Barrett, supra note 12, at 725.
57. An idea expressed orally is clearly not within the subject matter of copyright.
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removes ideas from the subject matter of copyright.5 8 Others argue that
ideas are works of authorship which, when fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
section 102(a), but left unprotected by section 102(b).5 9 This argument
has yet to be definitively settled. Therefore, the property theory of
protecting ideas is still viable in those jurisdictions that choose to recognize
it.
3. Summary
The property theory of protection is, at best, a sporadic means for
some courts to provide a remedy to the idea-man, and at worst, a
misconceived notion that should never have been accorded such recog-
nition. Despite any precedential support, the property theory of idea law
faces the almost insurmountable burdens of novelty, concreteness, and
federal preemption. In sum, the idea-man should look elsewhere for
protection. The property theory should be the protection of last resort.
B. Quasi-Contract or Unjust Enrichment Theory
A quasi-contract is not a true contract - it is not based upon any
intent of the parties or on any promises they may have made; rather, it is
an obligation created by law for reasons of justice.' The purpose of
granting recovery where no promise was actually made is to prevent one
party from capitalizing upon an idea at another party's expense or, in other
words, to avoid unjust enrichment.6' Specifically, a quasi-contract or
contract implied in law requires that (1) the defendant be enriched, (2) at
the plaintiff's expense, (3) under circumstances that, in equity and good
58. Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., 591 F. Supp. 726, 739 (N.D. IM. 1983)
(items that "are expressly excluded from copyright protection, § 102(b) ... fail the subject matter
test of § 301(a) and are not preempted."); Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (since ideas "are not entitled to protection under the Act, they are not preempted by the
Act."). See Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1119 (1977).
59. Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 149 (Dist. D.C. 1980) (where items such
as facts, themes, research, and, by analogy, ideas "have been deliberately exempted from the
scope of copyright protection to vindicate the overriding goal of encouraging contributions to
recorded knowledge, the states are pre-empted from removing such material from the public
domain").
60. NIMMER supra note 2, § 16.03 at 16-10; Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp.
451, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Schott v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 259 A.2d 443, 449 (Pa. 1969);
Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 267 (Cal. 1956); Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 959 (Cal.
1953).
61. Werlin, 528 F. Supp. at 465.
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conscience, call for an accounting by the wrong-doer, and (4) that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily accepts the plaintiff's services and the
concomitant benefit.62
1. Scope of Protection
Quasi-contract typically arises where the transaction resembles a
normal contractual relationship but the parties did not manifest mutual
assent.6' However, there is no set formula or set of facts which will lead
to recovery. Courts consider many factors, including: the nature of the
idea, the relationship and interaction of the parties, public policy concerns,
and the expectations of the parties.' Courts do not require a special
relationship or confidential disclosure,65 but they do require novelty and
concreteness. 66
2. Problems
The idea-man trying to recover under quasi-contract is faced with
many of the same problems as a counterpart pursuing a property theory
claim. First, the requirements of novelty and concreteness will often be a
claim-killing burden, depending on the jurisdiction and its definition of
each. 7 Second, federal preemption is a grave concern, as courts seem to
disagree over whether quasi-contract theory entails the same rights covered
by the Copyright Act."
Third, courts are prone to make mistakes in applying the quasi-
contract theory. For instance, some courts have mistakenly denied
protection under a quasi-contract theory, reasoning that where no express
62. See I ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRACrs § 19 (1963).
63. NMMER, supra note 2, § 16.03 at 16-11; WLLISTON, CONTRACTS Ch. 6, § 3 (rev. ed.
1936).
64. See MICHAEL A. EPsTEIN, MODERN INTELLE ruAL PROPERTY 285 (2d ed. 1992).
65. Id. at 280.
66. Id.; see also Murray v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., Inc., 844 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir. 1988);
Werlin, 528 F. Supp. at 465; Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Cal. 1970).
67. See discussion supra part II.A.l.a-b.
68. Compare Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981,986 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (unjust enrichment claim preempted because it involved the equivalent claims of
reproduction, distribution, and display covered under the Copyright Act); P.I.T.S. Films v.
Laconis, 588 F. Supp. 1383, 1386 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (unjust enrichment claim contained no
element different from copyright infringement) with Schuchart & Assoc., Professional Eng'rs Inc.
v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 945 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (unjust enrichment claim not
preempted because it involved a claim for value of services, not covered under copyright); Werlin
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (quasi-contract protection is
qualitatively different from federal copyright protection).
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or implied-in-fact contract existed, there should be no recovery under quasi-
contract.69 This ignores the fact that the function of quasi-contract is to
provide a remedy, particularly when there is no contract. 70 Other courts
have denied protection where the plaintiff based a claim on the existence
of custom in the industry.71 Although it is firmly-rooted law that custom
will not create an express or implied-in-fact contract contrary to the
intention of the parties,72 it would be totally consistent with the purpose
of quasi-contract to allow custom to influence the determination of whether
the defendant was unjustly enriched.73
Fourth and finally, it is possible that allowing recovery in quasi-
contract contradicts generally accepted principles of property law. If
property theory is not recognized then quasi-contract theory should not be
either. That is, if an idea is common property, unprotected by express or
implied-in-fact contract, copyright, or the property theory of idea law, then
the taking of the idea can result in no unjust enrichment. The taker has
taken nothing to which the idea-man or anyone else could claim exclusive
ownership.74
3. Summary
While quasi-contract protection is recognized with greater frequency
than property theory, it is difficult to distinguish the two as currently
applied. Although quasi-contract requires additional factors to exist before
protection will be afforded, the granting of protection is no less ad hoe than
under a property theory which requires novelty and concreteness. Quasi-
contract theory may be the means for a court to be equitable; but, in the
end, inconsistent application creates unpredictability and promotes
litigation.
69. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.03[A] at 16-12; Davis v. General Foods Corp., 21 F. Supp.
445, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
70. Schott v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 259 A.2d 443, 449 (Pa. 1969) (stating that quasi-
contract recovery may be had without assent by the parties, and even in spite of a party's contrary
intent).
71. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.03[A] at 16-13; Gromback Prods. v. Fred Waring, 59 N.E.2d
425, 428 (N.Y. 1944).
72. Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 206 (1879) ("Where there is no contract, proof of
usage [i.e., custom] will not make one.").
73. Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679, 695 (1970).
74. This argument weakens as one considers that the value of an idea derives not from a
direct property interest in the idea, but in the ability to disclose or withhold disclosure of the idea.
This argument is discussed infra in part V.
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Courts have mistakenly required novelty and concreteness, and have
misunderstood the scope of quasi-contract law, especially as distinguished
from the property theory. As a result, courts are failing to provide
protection to idea-men and condoning the unjust enrichment of prospective
purchasers when, instead, they should be righting wrongs for reasons of
justice.
The entertainment industry's development process is a perfect
reflection of the types of situations that quasi-contract was created to
remedy. In the typical entertainment industry idea case, the prospective
purchaser knowingly and voluntarily accepts the idea-man's services either
by direct solicitation of the idea or by setting up a meeting for the future
disclosure of the idea. Industry custom, including the frequent development
and use of ideas, gives rise to the expectation of remuneration for the idea-
man's disclosure of the idea. If the idea is ultimately developed and used
without payment to the idea discloser, the purchaser has been unjustly
enriched at the idea-man's expense, and equity compels an accounting. In
sum, entertainment industry idea disclosure cases are ripe for protection
under quasi-contract, and courts are simply missing the boat.
C. Express Contract Theory
An express contract exists where one party promises to pay for the
use of a submitted idea.7' The express contract theory of recovery is
more widely recognized by the courts because it is not subject to the same
policy concerns as the quasi-contract or property theories. The fear that
monopolization of ideas will foreclose progress in the arts and sciences is
not present under the express contract theory because a contract binds only
the parties and leaves others free to use the idea.76 Moreover, state
protection under the express contract theory may actually aid dissemination
in some instances. For example, a purchaser, unable to come up with a
saleable product, is often able to develop and market an idea only because
of a contract for disclosure with an idea-man.77 Given that the idea-man
typically finds no shelter under copyright law or property theory, dissemi-
nation is enhanced by the built-in incentives of contract theory; namely, the
purchaser profits from the exploitation of the idea, the idea-man benefits
through payment of the contract price by the purchaser, and the public
75. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.04.
76. Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, I., dissenting);
Hammond, supra note 18 at 114 ("Any party outside the contract is quite free to use it without
restrictions. The encumbered party simply agrees not to do what they could otherwise do."). IL
77. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979).
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gains access to the idea and the freedom to use and develop the idea once
marketed by the purchaser.
1. Scope of Protection
Idea protection under the express contract theory is merely a
recognition of the general freedom to contract. Therefore, express contract
cases are decided "by reference to the agreement between the parties and
the rules of contract construction, as well as the principals [sic] of law
enunciated in the applicable legal authorities.""
2. Problems
As always, the issues of novelty,79  concreteness,80  and pre-
emption"1 cause problems. In addition, contract claims raise difficulties
relating to the consideration requirement and the statute of frauds.
a. Consideration, Novelty, and Concreteness
Some courts, in their misguided attempts to avoid the monopolization
of ideas, have used the consideration requirement to void contracts for
ideas. Specifically, these courts require that the idea qualify as property in
order to be valid consideration. 2 These courts insist that the idea be
novel and/or concrete before the contract will be enforced.8 3  As dis-
cussed, the novelty and concreteness requirements are often claim-killing
burdens, protecting only the most developed ideas.
78. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1990).
79. Professor Nimmer argues that under the express or implied contract theories, courts
should respect the parties' freedom to contract and not seek to impose the added requirements of
novelty or originality. After all, "the idea-user is paying for the disclosure of the idea and not
for the discloser's efforts in creating the idea." NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.08[B].
80. Professor Nimmer argues that concreteness should not be a requirement in either express
or implied contract cases because the purchaser knowingly and willingly enters into the bargain
to pay for the idea, regardless of how abstract. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.08[A].
81. A claim based upon a contractual agreement has been considered to be qualitatively
different from a copyright claim, and not preempted by the Copyright Act. Ronald Litoff, Ltd.
v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp 981, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also NM , supra note
2, § 16.04[C] (reasoning that beyond the mere acts of reproduction, distribution, performance or
display, a contract claim requires the additional element of an express or implied promise before
the claim may be pursued).
82. Masline v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 112 A. 639, 641 (Conn. 1921).
83. Id (novelty requirement); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 75 (Cal.
1950) (concreteness).
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Demanding novelty or concreteness in an express contract is absurd,
regardless of whether the court requires them outright, or shrouds them in
the consideration requirement. The parties have voluntarily bargained for
the disclosure of the idea on their own terms, without concern for the idea's
novelty, concreteness, or property status. By exacting such requirements,
the court is adding terms that were not considered important by the parties.
However, not all courts are so draconian in their ways. Many sidestep
the consideration land-mine altogether. These courts allow the contract to
stand based upon the theory that the service of disclosing the idea, not the
idea itself, is the consideration.' As a result, such courts recognize a
binding contract when one party promises to pay and the other party
discloses the idea, regardless of its concreteness or novelty.85
But even in these courts, contracting for the disclosure of an idea does
not always lead to smooth sailing. There are still two instances that may
cause a contract to be considered void. First, when one is already bound
to disclose an idea by law or contract, neither the promise to disclose nor
the actual disclosure will be valid.86 Second, past consideration will not
be valid consideration. 7 That is, if the idea-man discloses an idea before
the other party promises to pay, then even if the other party later makes
such a promise, there is no binding contract because past consideration is
not valid consideration.
Yet, at least one jurisdiction has recognized an exception to the past
consideration rule. Where there is an express promise made after the
disclosure of an idea, California courts reason that past services rendered
in the expectation of payment create a moral obligation on the other party
which serves as the consideration for the subsequent promise.8
In all, courts are generally fair in applying the traditional rules of
contract, and most recognize that the service of disclosing an idea
constitutes valid consideration. The California exception to the past
consideration rule is probably a better way to respect the intent of the
parties. However, even if a court rejects such an exception, the traditional
84. Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Cal. 1966); Chandler
v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1957); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (Cal. 1956).
85. Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1216 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Donahue,
54 Cal. Rptr. at 134; High v. Trade Union Currier Publishing Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526, ajfd 89
N.Y.S.2d 527 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949); Elfenbein v. Luckenbach Terminal, Inc., 166 A. 91 (NJ.
1933).
86. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16-04[A].
87. Id
88. Desny, 299 P.2d at 278; Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1966).
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past consideration rule has provided, and should continue to provide,
predictable and equitable results. As for those courts which require
novelty, concreteness, or property status in the idea subject to contract, they
should step down off their pedestal and recognize the parties freedom to
contract, i.e., to bind themselves to mutually agreed upon terms.
b. Statute of Frauds
Contracting for the disclosure of an idea raises two problems under
the statute of frauds. First, the statute of frauds invalidates oral or implied
promises when the price of the goods exceeds $500.89 This roadblock is
usually circumvented because most jurisdictions recognize an exception
when there is an acceptance and receipt of goods.' However, given the
intangible nature of an idea, it is difficult to gauge when the actual receipt
of the idea has taken place. To avoid this, it has been suggested that the
transaction be regarded as a sale of services in disclosing the idea, not a
sale of the idea itself.91
A second problem arises because the statute of frauds invalidates
contracts not in writing if they are not performed within one year.
However, this problem is easily averted by the generally recognized
exception that where one has completely performed under an oral contract,
the one-year requirement is inapplicable.92
3. Summary
The express contract theory is the most widely recognized of the five
theories, and rightfully so. An express contract remedy is clearly the most
equitable as it usually reflects the intents and expectations of both parties.
The formal requirements of contract law have been, and should continue
to be, enforced in idea protection cases. After all, such contracts are no
different than any other contracts for the purchase and sale of marketable
goods or services. As for the problems discussed above, courts should
hesitate before forcing their own interpretation upon the parties. Specifi-
cally, the novelty and concreteness requirements have no place in the
contract theory of idea protection.
89. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.04[B].
90. Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 256 P.2d 962 (Cal. 1953) (en banc) (ignoring the
receipt requirement, the court held the contract valid and excepted from the statute by reason of
defendant's acceptance of part of the goods).
91. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.04[B].
92. Id.; Blaustein v. Burton, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970).
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Express contract provides the easiest road to the best remedy for the
idea-man. However, a lack of bargaining power and poor business acumen
often leaves the idea-man wishing for an express contract and the
protection it provides.
D. Implied-in-Fact Contract Theory
The only difference between an implied-in-fact contract and an
express contract is that the consent of the parties is expressed by conduct
instead of words.93 For example, one court created an analogy between
the act of a movie producer promising to pay an idea-man for the
disclosure of the idea-man's idea and the more familiar acts of soliciting
advice from a lawyer or a doctor.94 Specifically, the court stated:
The lawyer or doctor who applies specialized knowledge
to a state of facts and gives advice for a fee is selling and
conveying an idea. In doing that he is rendering a service. The
lawyer and doctor have no property rights in their ideas, as such,
but they do not ordinarily convey them without solicitation by
client or patient. Usually the parties will expressly contract for
the performance of and payment for such services, but, in the
absence of an express contract, when the service is requested
and rendered the law does not hesitate to infer or imply a
promise to compensate .... The person who can and does
convey a valuable idea to a producer who commercially solicits
the service or who voluntarily accepts it knowing that it is
tendered for a price should likewise be entitled to recover.95
The policy implications are the same under the implied-in-fact contract
theory as under the express contract theory. However, because the contract
is being inferred from the conduct of the parties, courts are more cautious
in providing a remedy.
1. Scope of Protection
Basically, a contract, either express or implied-in-fact, exists when two
parties agree to do or not to do something.96 Thus, the "million dollar"
question is, when have the parties agreed?
93. See Vantage Point, 529 F. Supp. at 1216. For a discussion of the elements required
under California law, see Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).
94. Desny, 299 P.2d at 266-67.
95. Id.
96. BLACK'S LAW DIcTiONARY 322 (6th ed. 1990).
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Before finding an agreement, courts consider many factors, including:
the relationship and interaction between the idea-man and the purchaser, the
customary idea submission and compensation policy of the purchaser, and
the customary idea submission and compensation policies of the industry
as a whole.97 Moreover, some courts continue to require novelty and
concreteness.98 Although the inquiry is fact-specific, some general rules
and exceptions have developed.
First, by definition, an implied-in-fact contract will not be found when
the purchaser appropriates an idea by some means other than consensual
agreement with the idea-man.99 Conversely, when the purchaser requests
that the idea-man submit an idea, courts are willing to imply a promise to
pay if the puchaser uses it." Ordinarily, exculpatory language in the
request will not relieve the recipient from a duty to pay for the use of the
idea.01
Second, when the idea-man gives an idea to another party without
first striking an agreement, courts will not imply an agreement.3 2 "The
idea man who blurts out his idea without having first made his bargain has
no one but himself to blame for the loss of his bargaining power."10"
However, industry custom, coupled with other favorable facts, may negate
this requirement.'°4 The rationale for such an exception is that the idea-
man's submission of his idea is an acceptance of the purchaser's implied
continuing offer to pay for any submitted ideas which he elects to use.05
Moreover, regardless of industry custom, courts have found an exception
where the idea recipient had an opportunity to prevent the idea-man from
97. Epstein, supra note 63, at 282-283.
98. Id. at 284; see discussion supra part II.C.2.a. (regarding the irrationality of such
requirements in contract).
99. Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1966).
100. Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1970); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d
257 (Cal. 1956); Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1953); Kurlan v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 256 P.2d 962 (Cal. 1953); Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 28 N.Y.S.2d 404
(N.Y. 1941).
101. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1930); Yadkoe v. Fields, 151 P.2d 906
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Elfenbein v. Luckenbach Terminals, Inc., 166 A. 91 (1933). Cf.
Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1934); Davis v. General Foods Corp.,
21 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Thomas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 38 A.2d 61 (Pa. 1944).
102. O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Smith v. Recrion
Corp., 541 P.2d 663 (Nev. 1975); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130
(1960); Desny, 299 P.2d at 270.
103. Desny, 299 P.2d at 270.
104. Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., 529 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Kurlan v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 256 P.2d 962 (Cal. 1953).
105. NIMER, supra note 2, § 16.05[B].
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making his submission, but through inaction allowed the idea to be
submitted. In such a situation, California courts have inferred such inaction
to be a promise to pay for the idea if it is used."° However, putting an
affirmative duty on the recipient is problematic because his inaction will
burden them with an obligation regarding an idea that, as a matter of law,
is the property of neither the idea-man nor anyone else. 7
2. Problems
The problems associated with the implied-in-fact contract theory are
similar to those encountered in the express contract theory, especially in
relation to the statute of frauds, preemption, consideration, concreteness,
and novelty."8 A problem unique to implied-in-fact contracts is deciding
which facts are necessary to the existance of an implied contract.' 9 As
shown above, the courts have created some general rules and exceptions to
aid in their analyses; but, as with any case by case determination, the
decisions vary as much as the facts.
3. Summary
Proving the existence of a contract under the implied-in-fact theory is
more difficult than under the express contract theory. However, once
proven, courts are as willing to provide a remedy to the idea-man under
implied contract as under express contract. Yet, because the intent and the
expectations of the parties must be grafted from conduct instead of words,
courts remain cautious to avoid overreaching and creating a bargain where
none existed. In all, implied contract theory provides an adequate remedy
for the idea-man. The problem is, the idea-man must actually contract.
E. Confidential Relationship Theory
1. Scope of Protection
A confidential relationship exists when "one has gained the confidence
of the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in
106. Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968); Donahue, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 138; Desny v.
Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
107. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 16.05[C].
108. See discussion supra part I1.C.2.
109. NIMMnR, supra note 2, § 16.05.
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mind." ' ° In other words, when dealing on unequal terms, one party
becomes reliant on the other's good faith. Typically, a confidential
relationship will exist in areas such as: employer-employee relations,
family or friendship relationships, or any relationship similar to the
confidences which arise between physician-patient or priest-penitent."'
Occasionally a confidential relationship has been recognized when an idea-
man submits an idea to one who will transform the idea into a tangible
product and produce it for market."'
Once a confidential relationship is established, protection is afforded
in one of several ways. Some courts ground a confidential relationship
claim in either express or implied contract,' while others provide a
remedy in quasi-contract under breach of confidence,114 and the remain-
der look to equity for breach of confidential relationship. 15  Such
differences are important because the remedies and defenses will vary
depending on whether the action sounds in contract or in equity.
Professor Nimmer has pointed out that from a policy standpoint,
courts should be more apt to recognize a confidential relationship claim
when it arises from an express or implied-in-fact contract, or when it arises
from one of the generally accepted confidential relationships. 16 He
further argues that courts should be hesitant to grant a remedy under quasi-
contract when no such relationship exists."7 At first blush, his con-
clusion seems correct.1 After all, when a bargain is struck for the
confidential disclosure of an idea, the courts, by granting a remedy for
breach, are simply enforcing the will of the parties. Similarly, when no
contract exists, the courts should exercise their equitable powers to protect
a confidential disclosure by an idea-man who has relied upon a fiduciary
or confidential relationship. However, where no contract or previous
110. Davies v. Krasna, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 713 (1975).
111. Id; Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., 88 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
112. Ojala v. Bohlin, 2 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1960); Jones v. Ulrich, 95 N.E.2d 113 (I1. App. Ct.
1950); cf. Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62 (D. Mass. 1942).
113. Berry v. Glidden, 92 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, 28
N.Y.S.2d 404 (1941). For a discussion of the pros and cons of contract-based recovery in idea
protection, see discussion supra part 11.C-D.
114. Davies v. Krasna, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1975). For a discussion of the pros and cons of
quasi-contract based recovery in idea protection, see discussion supra part I.B.
115. See Davies, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
116. NIMER, supra note 2, § 16.06.
117. Id.
118. The author disagrees with the conclusion that quasi-contract should be employed
especially when the idea has been solicited in an arms-length negotiation, and the solicitor has
been unjustly enriched. See discussion supra part 1I.B.3. and infra part V. for arguments why
quasi-contract recovery should be expanded in the law of ideas.
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relationship exists, the courts should not misuse their equitable powers by
finding an agreement or a confidential relationship between two parties that
are ordinarily considered to be at arms-length.
2. Problems
Because the confidential relationship theory of idea protection is often
based on one of the other four theories of protection, the problems it faces
echo those problems associated with the other theories.11 9 More specifi-
cally, when the theory is based in equity as a breach of confidential
relationship, the problems are similar to those of quasi-contract.' 0
3. Summary
Although presented as its own theory, the confidential relationship
theory is a hybrid of the other theories. That is, when a court grants
recovery under this theory, it is doing so either at law under express
contract or implied-in-fact contract, or in equity under quasi-contract or
breach of confidential relationship. Therefore, when recovery is granted in
contract, the principles and problems applicable to express or implied-in-
fact contract theories become important. Similarly, when recovery is
granted in equity, the principles and problems applicable to quasi-contract
and, to a lesser degree, property theories gain import.
The confidential relationship theory provides adequate protection when
the idea-man has negotiated with confidants or when he has contracted with
the prospective purchaser to keep the idea in confidence. However, when
the idea-man discloses his idea prior to contracting with a party in a typical
arms-length negotiation, he will usually find that the confidential relation-
ship theory will leave him high and dry.
119. For a discussion of problems, see supra parts II.A.2, II.B.2, II.C.2, and II.D.2.
120. See supra part II.B.2.
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Im. PRIMARY JURISDICTIONS: CALIFORNIA & NEW YORK
A. California
California courts do not recognize the property' 2' or quasi-con-
tract"z theories of idea protection, but do recognize both the implied-in-
fact and express contract theories," 3 regardless of whether the idea is
expressed orally or in writing.24 While an express contract is inferred
from words, an implied-in-fact contract is inferred from actions based upon
the "reasonable person" test. 5 That is, an implied-in-fact contract will
be found where a reasonable person would believe the party's actions
convey an intent to enter into a contract.1
26
Under both contract theories, consideration and mutual assent are
required, 27 while novelty and concreteness are not." Furthermore,
California courts find the act of disclosing the idea to be adequate
consideration. 29 However, disclosure alone is not enough to create a
contract, there must be a countervailing promise, solicitation, or voluntary
acceptance. As a result, a gratuitous disclosure will not create a unilateral
contract. 30 Moreover, if the idea discloser is relying on circumstances
to prove a promise, California courts hold that "[tihe law will not imply a
promise to pay for an idea from the mere facts that the idea has been
conveyed, is valuable, and has been used for profit .... "1
31
In all, a contract is recognized when the following test is met: "(1)
one must submit a valuable idea to an offeree; (2) the offeree must either
have solicited or voluntarily accepted the idea disclosure; (3) the offeree
121. Desny, 299 P.2d at 265 ("[it is clear that California does not now accord individual
property type protection to abstract ideas."). Il
122. Donahue, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 137 ("[r]ecovery for the use of an idea must be based either
on an express or implied in fact contract.... The law will not imply a promise, never made
expressly or impliedly, to pay for something which defendant can have for the taking.") (citations
omitted).
123. See, Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
124. Compare Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1966); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950); Chandler v. Roach,
319 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1957) with Blaustein, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 322-25.
125. Desny, 299 P.2d at 267.
126. Id. at 267.
127. Chandler, 319 P.2d at 780.
128. Donahue, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
129. Chandler, 319 P.2d at 780.
130. Desny, 299 P.2d at 270.
131. Id.
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must know that the idea disclosure was made with the expectation of
remuneration upon use; and (4) the offeree must actually use the idea."
132
B. New York
New York cases are a bit more unsettled. As in California, the
express and implied-in-fact contract theories are the only forms of
protection for the idea-man in New York. However, New York courts have
not yet reached a consensus on what exactly is protected under these
theories.
1. Express Contracts
It is clear that New York courts protect both novel and non-novel
ideas made under written contract.13  However, there is a split among
New York courts over whether protection extends to both novel and non-
novel ideas made under express oral agreements, with some courts
requiring novelty before protecting ideas disclosed under express oral
agreement. 134
2. Implied-in-Fact Contracts
The predominant view in New York courts is that a novel idea can be
the subject of an implied-in-fact contract, although there is some authority
which concludes novel ideas are protected only by express contract. 35
On the other hand, it is established in New York that non-novel ideas will
not be protected under any implied-in-fact contract theory.
36
IV. STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTION UNDER CURRENT DOcTRINEsF 37
The previous two sections have established the principles of idea law.
It is clear that in certain circumstances, courts are willing to protect idea-
men from conniving purchasers. But, it is equally clear that in other
132. Ronald Caswell, A Comparison and Critique of Idea Protection in California, New
York, and Great Britain, LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 717, 757 (1992) (reducing the Desny v.
Wilder holding to a four pronged test); Blaustein, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
133. Caswell, supra note 132, at 747.
134. Id. at 748.
135. Il at 749.
136. 1 at 750.
137. In order to provide guidance to the idea-man and his prospective purchaser in regard
to the current doctrines of idea protection, this section ignores the problems currently facing the
law of ideas, and accepts the law as is. See infra part V. for a suggested model for change.
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circumstances, the courts are willing to protect potential purchasers from
overzealous idea-men. This section will provide strategies for both parties
to promote agreement and avoid litigation.
The difficulty with idea protection is that it is governed by state law.
The states vary in not only which of the five theories they adopt, but also
how they choose to interpret the ones they do adopt. As a result, the idea-
man and purchaser are compelled to forum shop. Comparing the two
primary jurisdictions, the idea-man is favored in California, while the
purchaser is favored in New York. However, regardless of the jurisdiction,
an express written contract is the best solution for both parties.
More often than not, the parties fail to adequately strike a bargain
prior to disclosure of the idea. Thus, the idea-man is usually left arguing
that there was an implied contract; or begging the court to use its equitable
powers to find a quasi-contract or a confidential relationship; or, even
worse, insisting that the court find a property right in his idea. The
potential purchaser is left defending each of these claims. Both parties
would be saved the uncertainty and expense of litigation if they followed
some simple procedures that would protect their interests in any juris-
diction.
Typically, the idea-man lacks bargaining power because he is reliant
upon the potential purchaser's resources to develop and market his idea.
The idea-man usually has no leverage, except for having an idea in which
the potential purchaser may be interested. Therefore, it is clearly in the
best interest of the idea-man to establish his expectations prior to the
disclosure of his idea.
Similarly, the prospective purchaser should be equally diligent in
revealing his expectations prior to disclosure. If the potential purchaser
opts to hear the pitch without first establishing a payment obligation, the
purchaser faces the uncertainty of litigation in the law of ideas. With the
vast number of ideas that a prospective purchaser hears in any given year,
the potential for liability is enormous. Moreover, the potential purchaser
faces the more intangible liability of losing goodwill, by offending the
creative personalities upon which he relies. No matter how little bargaining
power an individual idea-man may have, the idea-men collectively hold the
creative juices upon which the purchaser thrives. After all, there is still a
viable and competitive market for good ideas, and no purchaser will want
to damage its opportunities in that market.
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A. Purchaser
The primary goal of a potential purchaser of ideas is to avoid any
situation in which an overzealous idea-man may claim that the purchaser
used his idea in breach of contract or in breach of confidential relationship,
or that the purchaser is liable under quasi-contract for unjust enrichment.
Proof of these claims is often fact-specific and depends on the court's
interpretation of the facts in relation to various factors. Therefore, it is in
the best interest of either party to create a trail of facts to support his
position.
Any purchaser who solicits ideas or is prone to receiving unsolicited
ideas should have a written policy which sets forth the internal procedures
to be followed in each case.138 The policy should clearly state whether
or not the purchaser pursues unsolicited ideas and, further, should be
distributed and explained to every employee.
1. Unsolicited Ideas
Upon receipt of an unsolicited idea, the purchaser's first step should
always be to isolate it from any employee who may use it. Specifically,
the unsolicited idea should not be copied, distributed, or discussed by
anyone, except as required when sending it to the employee in charge of
returning or pursuing unsolicited ideas."' This step takes place regard-
less of whether company policy is to review and evaluate unsolicited ideas,
or to reject them flat out.
138. See Epstein, supra note 63, at 288-288.6. See also BBC's New Deal for Indies, THE
HOLLYWOOD REPoRTER, July 7, 1993. The Hollywood Reporter provides that the BBC, in
conjunction with the Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television, introduced new procedures
to deal with independent producers. Id. The procedures are a response to complaints by the
producers that program ideas have been "lifted" by the BBC. Il The procedures include: (1)
giving an explanation on how program ideas may be submitted; (2) logging all program proposals,
sending an acknowledgement within 10 working days, and sending an initial response within four
weeks; (3) explaining the criteria the BBC will use to evaluate program ideas; (4) giving
independent producers the names of contacts within the network; and (5) establishing an appeal
process. L
139. See Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., 529 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(Defendant not required to compensate idea-man when unsolicited submissions are routed "to the
customer service department without being shown to anyone in game development."); Downey
v. General Foods Corp., 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (N.Y. 1972) (General Foods not required to
compensate idea-man when idea immediately isolated from employees who could have used it).
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a. Policy Against Accepting Unsolicited Ideas
If company policy is to reject unsolicited ideas without consideration,
the employee in charge should immediately send the original letter back to
the idea-man. Along with the original letter, the employee should also send
a company letter stating that the idea was not disclosed, distributed, or
discussed by anyone in the company except by the employee who signs the
letter. Furthermore, the company letter should state the purchaser's policy
that unsolicited ideas are never used. Finally, it would do no harm to send
a copy of the company's written policy along with the letter.
b. Policy For Accepting Unsolicited Ideas
If the purchaser does consider unsolicited ideas, it should immediately
send a letter explaining the company's compensation policy for using ideas.
The letter should state that the idea will not be disclosed, distributed,
evaluated or discussed by anyone within the corporation until the idea-man
agrees to the company's compensation policy. This policy should discuss
the rights and liabilities of the parties regarding the purchaser's evaluation
of the idea.
Specifically, the terms of the compensation policy should include
whether: the corporation requires novelty, originality, or concreteness; it
compensates for all ideas submitted, or for only those actually used, or for
none at all; an evaluation and review by the company creates an agreement
to compensate; an evaluation and review creates a confidential relationship;
an evaluation and review will limit the company's rights to any ideas
already within its possession; negotiations are considered to be an
admission of the novelty, originality, or concreteness of the idea; compen-
sation will be at the corporation's discretion; and the contract is binding
upon disclosure or actual use. These provisions will limit the court's
ability to find an implied-in-fact contract, quasi-contract, or confidential
relationship, and will aid in settling disputes under express contract.
2. Solicited Ideas
If the company solicits ideas, it should follow the policy for accepting
unsolicited ideas. Specifically, the company should negotiate the terms of
the agreement prior to the disclosure of the idea.
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B. Idea-Man
The primary goal of the idea-man is to protect his idea against
premature disclosure, or exploitation without just compensation. Although
some courts recognize protection under quasi-contract, the burden is often
too great to provide adequate and consistent protection. Therefore, the only
sure remedy is under contract theory.
In order to protect his rights under contract, the idea-man should make
it clear that he is divulging his idea in a confidential manner, and that he
expects that the prospective purchaser will not use or divulge the idea
without first entering into a good faith negotiation for compensation.
Specifically, he must negotiate the points discussed above.14
C. Summary
Both the potential purchaser and idea-man have a lot to lose in
litigation over the use of ideas. Therefore, their joint goal should be to
avoid confusion in the purchase and sale of the idea. Because proof of
most claims under idea law is fact-specific, it is in the best interests of both
parties to create a paper trail to support his or her position. It is obvious
that an express written contract is the best solution for both parties.
V. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD
The technological breakthroughs of the twentieth century have helped
fuel the fire for what, at present, seems to be an insatiable demand for
entertainment. The potential markets created by interactive television and
the information super-highway will continue to spur the demand for good
ideas. Thus, the successful entertainment companies of the twenty-first
century will be those that can continue to provide quality products in an
extremely competitive marketplace. As always, quality products begin with
quality ideas.
The task of finding quality ideas should not be too difficult given that
"ideas are as free as the air."'141 Of course, if ideas are truly as free as
the air, one must question why others would be willing to pay so much
money for them. The answer is simple: While the idea itself may be free,
140. See supra part IV.A.I.b.
141. See supra note 13 and accompaning text.
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finding the idea is a service that people are willing to pay for. 42 Like
any server, the idea-man provides a means to an end. Even though the end
would ordinarily cost nothing, it should not follow that the means to the
end is also free for the taking. This reasoning was perhaps best captured
by a California court which stated:
[The fact that the producer may later determine, with a little
thinking, that he could have had the same ideas and could
thereby have saved considerable money for himself, is no
defense against the claim of the writer. This is so even though
the material to be purchased is abstract and unprotected
material.
43
Therefore, the law of ideas should reflect the policy that disclosure of an
idea is a valuable service entirely separate from the idea's novelty,
concreteness, or property status.
After all, it would seem hypocritical in a capitalistic economy not to
reward the idea-man who brings the valuable idea to the entertainment
company. Regardless of whether the entertainment company spends time,
money, and effort developing the idea, the idea-man should be rewarded
commensurate with his contribution. Furthermore, the policy of paying for
good ideas is nothing new for the entertainment industry.144 Ideas have
been, and will continue to be, purchased in the form of completely
developed scripts; of undeveloped, abstract ideas; 45 and of moderately
developed ideas, fleshed out as "spec" scripts.146
142. Ideas are not freely usable by the entertainment media until the latter are made aware
of them. Blaustein, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
143. Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1957).
144. See Marx, supra note 3. For instance, producer David Permut walked into the office
of Frank Price (ex-head of Universal Pictures), merely hummed "Dum-de-dum-dum," and within
seconds had a deal to make the movie "Dragnet"; Permut also got $175,000 upfront for an
unknown screenwriter based only on the pitch for the movie "Blind Date"; and recently, Don
Simpson and Jerry Bruckenheimer, producers of 'Top Gun," shelled out a load of money for the
pitch project "Triads." Id. (other pitches that later became movies, include "Man's Best Friend,"
"Splash," "Kindergarten Cop," and "Night Shift").
145. The undeveloped, abstract idea is usually sold in pitch form. The reason studios and
producers buy an idea in pitch form is because the producer and the writer are able to collaborate
from inception, thereby bringing down the cost of having to rework an already developed script.
Id.
146. The reasons the spec script has become the most favored vehicle for buying and selling
ideas is because not only can the producer and writer collaborate from inception, bringing down
the purchaser's cost of having to rework an already developed script; but also, writers can sell
a moderately developed idea for more money than they could an undeveloped pitch, and the
purchaser is willing to pay the greater fee for the certainty of knowing exactly what they are
buying. Id.
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Without the five theories of idea protection, idea-men would be
helpless against purchasers who fail to fulfill their purchase obligations.
This includes not only sellers of undeveloped ideas in pitch form, but also
sellers of scripts. Although the script sellers may be protected by
copyright, they sometimes find that copyright protection is not enough. In
those situations, the real value lies not in the expression of the idea, but in
the disclosure of the idea itself.
The demand for quality ideas will 6ontinue to grow. With the
increased demand comes the need for consistent protection, so that both the
purchaser and seller are aware of their legal rights and responsibilities.
The express and implied contract theories provide adequate protection
when a bargain is actually struck. However, lack of bargaining power on
the part of the idea-man or skepticism on the part of the purchaser often
results in a failure to come to terms prior to disclosure. Therefore, some
other extended form of protection is necessary to adequately protect the
idea-man who is unable to reach an agreement prior to disclosure.
This remedy would emphasize the objective theory of contract by
explicitly recognizing that a meeting of the minds is not required; rather,
the parties' objective words, acts, and relationship form the basis for
recovery. Objective outward appearance, rather than state of mind, should
be the key determinant.'47 California courts have recognized this theory
for many years in their interpretation of implied-in-fact contracts, holding
the parties to be bound by the terms of an offer even when an offeree
expressly indicates dissent, provided his actions could only lawfully mean
assent.
148
Furthermore, this remedy would advance the objective theory of
contract beyond its current realm and recognize that industry custom can
be a pivotal factor in idea protection cases. Currently, courts are hesitant
to recognize an implied-in-fact contract based on industry custom.
Although most courts are willing to recognize a quasi-contract action based
on industry custom, many of those courts refuse to recognize quasi-
contracts in idea protection cases, reasoning that with no property right in
ideas, there can be no actionable misuse. Moreover, those courts that do
recognize quasi-contract recovery for ideas limit the idea-man's ability to
recover under such theory by requiring novelty and concreteness.
Therefore, the solution to the uncertainty of idea protection lies in
bridging the gap between implied-in-fact contract recovery and quasi-
147. See Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1966).
148. Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 268 (Cal. 1956); Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287,
293 (1968).
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contract recovery by recognizing the need for quasi-contract protection of
ideas and by removing the burdensome prerequisites of novelty and
concreteness.
Granted, this remedy should not require that a contract or equitable
remedy always 6e found when an idea-man discloses an idea to a
prospective purchaser. For instance, if an idea-man pitches an idea that is
already in development or already developed, he should not be accorded
recourse against a simultaneous, or prior, independent developer. There
must be some limitations to quasi-contract recovery lest all ideas be forever
foreclosed from the commons. However, the solution to this problem, as
some courts would have us believe, does not lie in the weighty and
outdated requirements of novelty, originality, and concreteness. Such
requirements weed out far too many valuable ideas for the wrong reasons.
Instead, this remedy focuses on value in the marketplace. Value can
be derived from either subsequent use by the purchaser, subsequent
disclosure by the purchaser and use by another party, or subsequent sale by
the purchaser. The purchaser will have the defense, as well as the burden
of proof, of independent production of the idea. Similar to copyright law,
access and similarity will defeat the defense. But, unlike copyright law,
substantial similarity will not prove access because the idea is in the public
domain and is not protected in and of itself. After all, the value of the idea
is directly linked to the ability to disclose or withhold disclosure.
Substantial similarity alone means nothing.
Courts should be more willing to imply a contract or grant an
equitable remedy under quasi-contract when an idea-man discloses an idea
to a prospective purchaser, especially when the purchaser could have freely
developed the idea prior to disclosure, but for some reason lacked the
intellectual or creative power to extract the idea from the commons. The
emphasis of idea-law has been misplaced. Value lies not in the idea, but
in the power to disclose or withhold disclosure of the idea. A legal system
that creates an incentive for disclosure compels development and ultimate
dissemination of the idea. Recognizing value in the disclosure of an idea
will not belittle or destroy the valid concern that protecting ideas inhibits
innovation as the scientist, inventor, or author is foreclosed from building
upon the ideas of others. Instead, it will aid progress and development
because protection granted for idea disclosure encourages dissemination;
and widespread dissemination allows all would-be-inventors the opportunity
to see farther by standing on the shoulders of the idea-man.
